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Abstract
A growing consensus seems to be emerging that neurocognitive
outcomes are poor for patients who have been critically ill with
acute respiratory distress syndrome and multiple organ failure.
However, intensive care unit delirium, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and other outcomes must be considered as potentially
confounding factors. Once the uncertainty around the causes of
postmorbid cognitive functioning is acknowledged, there are
practical implications for appropriate rehabilitative interventions
and there are ethical implications for the kinds of appropriate
disclosure to patients.
Introduction
Intensivists are now examining cognitive outcomes after
prolonged critical illness and advanced life support. The
results are gripping - Hopkins and Brett [1] suggest that ‘the
neurocognitive impairments in ARDS [acute respiratory
distress syndrome] survivors are long lasting and likely
permanent’.
I shall argue that it is difficult to pull apart the diverse factors
that might prevent a patient’s return to clear thinking. I shall
also argue that disclosure of information about cognitive
function, around which there is genuine uncertainty, may have
a negative or self-fulfilling effect on patients’ subsequent
progress. Thus, important questions are raised about both
the issue of disclosure of uncertain prognostic information
and about just what interventions might be appropriate for
those patients who are experiencing cognitive difficulties after
being gravelly ill.
In 1998 I spent weeks in an intensive care unit (ICU) with an
invasive infection, severe ARDS, and an alarming number of
organs in failure. I am also an academic philosopher and
found much that was of genuine ethical and methodological
interest in that first-hand experience. I shall draw on this
experience in what follows, keeping alert to the danger of
making unwarranted generalizations.
Measuring cognitive impairment: intensive
care unit delirium as a confounding factor
Delirium is a frequent phenomenon in critically ill patient
populations. Ely and coworkers [2] found that 18.5% of 275
mechanically ventilated patients had persistent coma, and of
the remaining patients 81.7% developed delirium. Similar
findings have been reported by other investigators [3-6]. The
delirium tends to involve bizarre and terrifying nightmares,
hallucinations, and paranoid delusions - often of the clinical
staff trying to rape, murder, or otherwise harm the patient
[7,8]. I have suggested that what makes ICU delirium
especially insidious is that, unlike nightmares and more like
paranoid delusions, it tends to occur in real time and hook
onto slices of external reality [9,10]. One takes actual people
in the ICU, whips up what is often a violent fantasy around
them, and then has the fantasy play itself out in the midst of
actual conversations and medical procedures. One loses
one’s grip on what is true and what is false because the true
and the false are mixed together in one mess of experience.
Kapfhammer and coworkers [11] surmised that the process
of traumatization in ARDS patients has to do with the initial
immediate threat of death by suffocation, the fact that
patients must be at least partially awake and cooperative
during weaning, the limited ability to communicate, and the
lack of possibilities to flee. However, Jones and colleagues
[12] have found that it is not memories of terrible real events
during critical illness that are related to the stress disorders
which can plague ex-ICU patients. It is the memories of the
delusions [12-14]. Only these memories were strenuously
retained over time - recall of unpleasant factual events, such
as suctioning and pain declined. Also, trauma patients, who
might be expected to experience increased psychological
distress because of memories of horrific actual events, did
not have higher levels of anxiety if they did not have memories
of delusions. It seems that the mental horrors experienced by
ICU patients are more traumatizing than the physical ones.
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There is some evidence that those who have delirium in the
ICU are at greater risk for cognitive dysfunction in the years
to come [15,16]. Of course, this kind of result requires
investigation into the default hypothesis: ICU delirium is a
symptom of a kind of brain failure, sedative use, etc., and that
very brain failure, sedative use, etc., is responsible also for the
subsequent cognitive impairment. That is, ICU delirium and
post-ICU cognitive impairment have a common cause, the
precise nature of which has yet to be discovered.
The heretical alternative hypothesis I want to put forward is
that rather than the delirium and the impairment having a
common cause, the experience of delirium might in some
instances be responsible for the low neuropsychological test
scores seen in post-ICU patients. Notice that both of the
hypotheses could well be true, as long as they are not taken
to be universal generalizations; in some instances there may
be a common cause and in some instances delirium may be a
confounding factor in testing for cognitive impairment. The
argument for the heretical hypothesis is as follows.
Depression and anxiety are known to exacerbate the findings
of neurological impairment [17]. Indeed, studies of cognitive
impairment screen for patients with these identifiable prior
psychological problems [18]. However, surely it is not only
pre-existing psychological problems that are potentially
confounding factors. We need also to consider psychological
and emotional problems that have come into existence during
and after ICU admission. My suggestion is that, at least
sometimes, what one may be seeing when one sees cognitive
dysfunction in patients discharged from the ICU may in part
be a lingering effect of devastating ICU delirium and the
struggle to cope with it.
This thought gets some support from Rothenhausler and
coworkers [18], who found their ‘most interesting result’ to be
that post-ARDS cognitive impairments involve attention
deficits and that other research suggests that this kind of
impairment ‘may be related to “psychological distress” or
emotional problems.’ That is, patients who become depressed
or otherwise distressed in the ICU can display the very kind
of cognitive impairment most associated with ARDS, and
distressed and depressed ex-ICU patients are thick on the
ground. Kapfhammer and colleagues [11] found ‘long-lasting
emotional sequelae for most patients’ after ARDS and
‘pronounced impairments in psychosocial dimensions of
health-related quality of life’. At 8 years, almost 24% were still
suffering from ‘full-blown PTSD [post-traumatic stress
disorder]’ and 17% from ‘sub-PTSD’. Hopkins and coworkers
[19] found 23% of patients to have moderate to severe
symptoms of depression and anxiety 2 years after discharge.
In my own case I had a whiff of this, and that was bad
enough. For a long time after my release, every time I saw or
heard an ambulance I was hit by a sinking feeling and by the
thought that there would now be all that effort to save one
measly life. I also found myself, night after night, dreaming
that I was in the ICU. Nothing terrible was happening so I
wouldn’t call them nightmares. I was simply back in the ICU,
watching the goings-on in the middle of the night - the patient
checks, the new admissions, the small disputes and dramas.
The result wasn’t a serious dysfunction but merely a dearth of
sleep for a year after discharge, as I would wake and stay
awake every night. Many of those affected by post-ICU PTSD
suffer much more debilitating effects.
What all of this points to is that it is clear that inquiry needs to
be conducted not just into the physical factors that might
influence the neurocognitive outcomes for those who have
been critically ill - factors about individuals such as increasing
age and prior cognitive reserve, genetic factors that might
influence responses to injury and capacity to repair, and
external factors such as the extent, duration, and nature of
specific metabolic events and sedative regimens. Inquiry
needs to be conducted also into the emotional and
psychological factors that might influence neurocognitive
outcomes for these patients. Then the question needs to be
asked, as Jackson and coworkers [16] have, whether these
are distorting influences on test scores.
Measuring cognitive impairment: further
entanglements
It is hard to convey just how terribly shaky one is after an
insult of this magnitude. De Jonghe and coworkers [20] and
Herridge and colleagues [21] have found persistent muscle
weakness in post-ARDS patients. In my own case it took a
while before I was up to the most minimal of tasks, such as
sitting in a chair, and I suffered a kind of weakness and
exhaustion that one simply does not encounter during the
normal course of life. It is also a kind of exhaustion that
manifests itself in a disguised way - disguised because one is
getting stronger by the day yet suffers sustained physical
deficits. It was enormously helpful during my rehabilitation
that I had run university track and knew the feeling of your
lungs being ripped out, having just bested your previous best
time. That extreme feeling I experienced after ARDS was
present during cardiovascular exercise for well over a year
after my discharge.
In light of this kind of phenomenon, I suggest that we need to
ask whether the rates of post-ICU cognitive impairment might
represent, at least in part, a psychological reaction not just to
the stress of ICU delirium but also to the whole range of
phenomena that arise from critical illness. We need to ask
whether reduced reserves, fatigue, extreme weakness, and
decreased quality of life might have an impact on the results
of tests for post-ICU cognitive impairment.
Another potential distorting influence has to do with
confidence, an issue that will bring us to what we might call
the moral outcomes. Being highly proficient in the art of
denial, I returned to my job after 1 month. In retrospect, I wasperforming poorly. I had just taken on an administrative
position and, as my predecessor filled me in on the countless
things that needed my attention, I heard mostly a blur of
words. This mental fuzziness was akin to a really bad
hangover. Even at the time I could not pull apart the mental
deficits from the physical ones. I could hardly stand, my
hands shook because of muscle loss, and I was always out of
breath. None of that is conducive to feeling and being
mentally sharp.
I pushed my rehabilitation very hard and 8 months after dis-
charge, apparently back to something approximating normal, I
gave a talk to the philosophy heavyweights in Oxford. It was a
disaster. I seemed not to have the lung capacity to speak to a
large audience, and I felt unable to grasp the complex and
tough questions that were thrown at me. I could see the
shape of the question (‘That’s the objection from the principle
of bivalence. I know what I have to say about that.’), but I
couldn’t actually formulate the answer. Things got better with
each subsequent talk, but it still isn’t clear to me whether this
gradually improving problem was cognitive dysfunction, a lack
of confidence, or a physical/pulmonary deficit.
What I want to point to is a potential looping effect, which
might further skew the estimation of rates of cognitive impair-
ment. For those who are suffering from mental fuzziness, the
inference that one is permanently cognitively damaged sits
there, waiting to be drawn. Drawing it, I suggest, might also
affect the results of neurocognitive tests to which the patient
is subjected. Studies show that the impact of stereotypes
and expectations of how one is likely to perform affect
performance on cognitive function tests [22]. We also know
from our own experience how confidence is fragile and
interwoven with success. Not being sure that you can hit that
backhand drive results in a truncated and useless shot; not
being confident about speaking in public diminishes your
performance. Thinking that you are likely to be cognitively
impaired may affect your performance on cognitive function
tests. Indeed, the very fact that the medical community is
interested in your neurocognitive status is an alert that there
is an expectation of cognitive damage.
Practical and ethical upshots
It might be asked whether poor performance, induced either
by some organic/biochemical problem (such as hypoxia or
liver failure) or by some functional problem (such as psycho-
logical fallout from delirium, fatigue, or a lack of confidence),
is poor performance nonetheless. That is, whatever the
cause, the brain is not working properly and there is
impairment. However, the difference in what induces poor
performance plays out both in terms of interventions and
ethical outcomes.
If the injury in a particular case is such that there is no actual
physical damage to the brain, but rather a reversible
metabolic injury, then it might be advisable for the patient to
engage in cognitive and cardiovascular exercises to improve
mental functioning. If the injury is due to prolonged hypoxia or
cessation of blood flow to the brain, resulting in cell death or
loss of nerve cell connectivity, then such rehabilitative inter-
ventions may be still appropriate. If, however, there is
anything to the idea of the plasticity of the brain, then other
kinds of intensive rehabilitation might be called for as well.
Alternatively, if the brain works properly physically, but psy-
chological or emotional problems disrupt cognitive function-
ing, appropriate interventions might include cognitive
behavior or drug therapy.
Work on post-ICU psychological rehabilitation is just now
starting to be conducted, led by Griffiths and Jones [23,24] in
the UK. As it continues, a constellation of issues - the
connection between confidence, fear of failure, motivation,
and success - needs to be carefully considered. If patients
think that they will do poorly on complex cognitive tasks, then
the temptation may be to not make the attempt, but declining
to undertake such tasks leads to lack of cognitive activity and
a further shrinking of possibilities.
Hard on the heels of these practical implications follow some
ethical implications. The measurement difficulties provide a
set of moral challenges for the intensivist. Hospitals fail some
of their most fragile patients if they are not sent out of the ICU
equipped with some substantial information about what is
likely to come [9,10,12,25]. Matters, however, are made
complex when it comes to the potential cognitive troubles
patients might encounter upon discharge. Should the results
of cognitive tests, if such tests were administered, be given to
patients or their families? Should they be told that cognitive
dysfunction is a common outcome? What are the practical
and ethical consequences of giving or withholding such
information?
This of course is a common problem in medicine. Physicians
grapple with the issue of whether to provide information when
they suspect that it is likely to have an adverse effect. It may
make patients, for instance, not do something they should do.
However, withholding information seems to deny full
autonomy to their patients.
What I have offered here is a set of considerations in favor of
caution in alerting patients and their families to scores on
postmorbid neurocognitive tests. It is not just that those
scores may be affected by confounding factors. The caution
is amplified because of the looping effect. Even if an
adequate test battery in regard to all potential confounding
factors could be developed, the ethical dimension of the
potential negative looping effect would not disappear.
Conclusions
It is one thing to try to get over the physical deficits after
being gravely ill. It is another thing to try to get over cognitive,
emotional, or psychological deficits. For in the latter case,
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been through a significant period of extreme madness and
cognitive dysfunction. You wonder whether you will entirely
shake it off. Then you are told (or you infer from the fact that
you are being tested) that the impairment might be
permanent. It is hard to imagine how this knowledge could fail
to loop back and affect your cognitive abilities.
It is important to see the depth of this point. It is not just that
knowledge of expected difficulties might make one perform
more poorly on cognitive function tests or may actually
exacerbate existing difficulties. It may have an even more
profound effect. As Hacking [26] puts it, when clinical
medicine identifies a kind of person - in this case, the cogni-
tively impaired survivor of critical illness - the identification
affects the persons identified. The target at which medicine is
aiming - the kind of person it is trying to characterize - starts
to move, as the identifications and diagnoses interact with
and change the people identified.
There is some reason to think that cognitive impairment after
critical illness provides an especially sharp example of this
phenomenon, because cognitive impairment strikes at the
very core of one’s personal identity. Who you are is bound up
with your cognitive capacities and characteristics. Having
those capacities and characteristics damaged quite literally
strikes at the heart of your self.
The physicians who cared for me exercised the requisite
caution after my release, no doubt due in part to an implicit
sensitivity to these looping effects. I might not have
embarrassed myself in Oxford had they warned me about the
expected cognitive impairments. However, treating me with
kid gloves in this way would have had, I surmise, disastrous
consequences. I might never have regained the confidence
required to expose myself to the usual onslaught of critical
scrutiny - a room full of excellent philosophers wanting to
maul my arguments. Indeed, I may have been one of those
who never fully returned to work, or my return to work might
have been the return of someone diminished. To follow up on
Hacking’s thought, it might have been the return of a different
kind of person.
Of course, mine is but one case out of many and it would be
foolish to suggest that every post-ICU patient should charge
ahead and ignore whatever difficulties they may be
encountering. Nonetheless, we can say at least the following
general things. It is clear that intensivists should continue to
try to explore the issue of cognitive outcomes after critical
illness, while trying their best not to trigger looping effects in
their patients and research subjects. Especially in the
absence of knowledge of the precise causes of cognitive
dysfunction, special care must be taken in what is said to
patients. Perhaps patients should be told that, just as they will
be experiencing physical weakness that will improve as the
weeks go by, they may well experience disturbed sleep,
depression, and cognitive weakness that may improve with
time. They should be told, if it is in fact the case, that the hope
is for a full or at least a significant recovery, on both physical
and cognitive fronts. Of course, they also need to be given a
realistic sense of what they can achieve so that they can feel
motivated and encouraged rather than crushed. The same
issues arise for people with strokes, dementia, brain tumors,
and traumatic brain injuries. Here it appears to be standard
practice to offer ‘neuro-rehab’ - cautiously optimistic advice
about the unknown future with encouragement to push the
boundaries and not to get upset if failure is experienced.
Something approximating the required sensitivity, it seems to
me, is achieved in the excellent ‘Patient/family info’ section of
ICUdelirium.org [27] from Ely’s ICU Delirium and Cognitive
Impairment Study Group at Vanderbilt University.
There is another ethical issue here. Care must be taken in
making the kind of argument I make, lest it be inferred that
research into post-ICU cognitive impairment is not something
that ought to go forward. This research has real significance
for the short- and long-term outcomes of those who have
been gravely ill, and nothing I say here diminishes its
importance. Nonetheless, it is important to ask the hard
questions and to try to arrive at the best answers.
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